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Law of the Sea Convention
For years, diplomats from many lands have been talking-sometimes elo-
quently, sometimes not-about the need for a new and equitable convention for
the oceans. In general, the talk has focused on substantive matters such as navi-
gation, the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the deep seabed, the
breadth and content of the economic zone, and the rights of landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states. Recently, however, attention has begun to
focus on an ostensibly procedural question-the settlement of disputes arising
out of the proposed Law of the Sea Convention. As the negotiations continue, it
is becoming increasingly evident that the dispute settlement issue is indeed both
substantive and crucial, for without adequate dispute settlement provisions, the
Law of the Sea Convention will be virtually meaningless.
To many, if not most, of the diplomats who have labored so long for a Law of
the Sea Convention, such an assertion might seem blasphemous. But is it in fact
so outrageous? Obviously, a new set of legal norms will provide the basis for a
more ordered and structured approach to oceans problems; obviously, too, the
worth of such norms will be greatly reduced or even nullified if each state may
make a unilateral determination of what the Law of the Sea Convention means.
When the subject of dispute settlement was first raised in the Law of the Sea
negotiations, it was not warmly embraced. Although there were a few
delegations that proclaimed the virtues of a judicial system to resolve disputes
arising from the application or interpretation of the Convention, the vast
majority of states were far more concerned with extending their jurisdiction
than in dealing with causes of potential disputes. Ironically, despite the fact that
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one of the main reasons for the convening of a United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea was to avoid possible future conflicts (such as the United
States-Ecuadorean "tuna war" and the British-Icelandic "cod war"), little time
was spent in debating the merits of a law of the sea chapter on the settlement of
disputes. And, perhaps even more ironically, as some states began to obtain
their objectives in the course of the negotiations, more and more of them came
to recognize that, without dispute settlement provisions, the compromises which
they had made and the rights they had been granted would be undermined.
While the trend in the Law of the Sea negotiations has clearly shifted in favor
of dispute settlement provisions, there remain-aside from the specific dispute
settlement articles themselves-problems which must be resolved. Of cardinal
significance are the relationship of the chapter to the rest of the Law of the Sea
Convention and the reluctance of some states to submit disputes to an
international forum for resolution.
With regard to the first impediment, it must be recognized that supporters of
dispute settlement are in agreement that the chapter on dispute settlement must
be an integral part of the Law of the Sea Convention. Apparent, too, is the fact
that those delegations which are either opposed to or less supportive of dispute
settlement are willing to accept an optional protocol or, alternatively, compulsory
conciliation. In both cases, the result would be the undermining of dispute
settlement and, accordingly, the Law of the Sea Convention. If dispute settlement
is relegated to an optional protocol, many states will obviously not sign it; and if
compulsory conciliation is the sole method for resolving disputes (there already
are provisions for conciliation if both parties agree), there will not be an assurance
that the dispute will be resolved since compulsory conciliation does not result in a
binding decision.
A second obstacle to be overcome is the reluctance of some states to have
disputes in which they are involved resolved by a third party. In this country, for
instance, the Connally amendment (which provides that any matter within the
domestic jurisdiction of the United States-as determined by the United
States-will be excluded from the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice) is still very much a part of our domestic law. Aside from the fact that it
places United States negotiators who urge the adoption of dispute settlement
provisions in an embarrassing position and is the source of constant amusement
to foreign diplomats, the Connally amendment forces the United States
delegation into the unfortunate and nearly untenable position of having, at
once, to negotiate with other delegations and to educate its own government.
Even though the United States has accepted arbitration and jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in many multilateral treaties and has stated that it
will examine every treaty with a view to accepting, wherever appropriate, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with respect to disputes arising
under the treaty, there obviously is at least potential resistance in the United
States to third-party resolution of disputes. Equally obviously, there is stiff
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opposition to third-party dispute settlement in a number-a rapidly declining
number-of other states.
Assuming that these two hurdles are overcome, the remaining question
concerns the proposed provisions themselves. Precisely how those provisions will
be worded is still unclear. What is clear, however, is that the dispute settlement
procedure will, in all likelihood, provide that:
* parties may choose the means which they wish to employ to resolve
disputes;
* obligations, established pursuant to a special agreement, to settle disputes
by resort to arbitration or judicial settlement will be controlling;
* parties may submit the dispute to conciliation if they both agree to do so;
* parties, when ratifying or otherwise consenting to the Convention, will
choose among the Law of the Sea Tribunal, the International Court of Jus-
tice, an arbitral tribunal, or special procedures (which would apply in areas
of fisheries, pollution, scientific research, or navigation disputes), although
if the special procedures are selected, the party must also select one of the
other procedures for disputes not covered by the special procedures;
* disputes may only be submitted to the forum chosen by the party against
which the proceedings are instituted;
* forums will have the power to indicate or prescribe provisional measures to
preserve the rights of the parties;
* access, except in the case of contractual disputes in the deep seabed area,
will be restricted to contracting parties;
* owners, operators, or masters of detained vessels will have the right to sue
for release of those vessels upon posting of a bond;
* disputes concerning the exercise of the sovereign rights, exclusive rights,
or domestic jurisdiction of a coastal state will not be subject to the dispute
settlement procedures, unless it is claimed that a coastal state has
interfered with the freedom of navigation or overflight, failed to give due re-
gard to substantive rights established by the Convention, or violated inter-
national environmental standards or criteria set forth in or established pur-
suant to the Convention; and
* parties may, when ratifying the Convention, exclude boundary disputes
where another third-party procedure is accepted, disputes where the United
Nations Security Council determines that proceedings would interfere with
its functions, and disputes concerning military activities.
These provisions represent a compromise. As is invariably the case with com-
promises, the results of the negotiation will not entirely please any, much less
all, of the parties or observers. In particular, those environmentally inclined will
decry the fact that only contracting parties can bring suits; ardent international-
ists and "one-worlders" will argue that there should be no exceptions-
especially one for military activities-from the dispute settlement procedures;
and some industrialized states will undoubtedly contend that the Law of the Sea
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Tribunal will preclude a fair hearing, since developing countries will control a
majority of the seats. But these claims, if not spurious, fail to take account of
political realities.
In the first place, as the debate at each session of the Conference demon-
strated, not only is there little support for the bringing of actions by nonparties,
but there also is violent opposition to extending the right to sue to individuals,
corporations, organizations, or nonparty states. In order to make the concept of
dispute settlement acceptable to the greatest number of delegations, the Presi-
dent of the Conference-the draftsman of the text-wisely decided to fall back
on existing practice and limit access to the dispute settlement procedures to
contracting parties.
Secondly, while the procedures would ideally apply to all disputes, they must
be subject to certain limited exceptions. In the case of military activities, for
example, the exception is of vital importance to avoid placing states in the
impossible position of either having to reveal militarily sensitive information or
being unable to defend themselves (against what may well be frivolous claims)
without producing such information. To avoid this situation, a narrowly pre-
scribed military exception has gained general support. Unlike some dangerously
broad exceptions which have been advanced-such as a blanket exception for
the economic zone-the military exception is limited in both scope and effect.
Finally, the proposed Law of the Sea Tribunal, as part of a system which
allows the defending state to choose the forum in which it will be sued, will
enable more delegations to embrace dispute settlement. Although the Inter-
national Court of Justice would appear to be a logical forum, developing
counties simply and flatly reject it as too industrially oriented; and although
arbitration would seem acceptable, it is neither appealing to developing coun-
tries nor free, at least in theory, from undesirable delays, since a party acting in
bad faith may postpone the proceedings indefinitely by having its arbitrator
continually "resign." For these reasons, the Law of the Sea Tribunal is being
viewed with increasing favor. And, despite the fact that developing-country
members of the tribunal may at first be inclined to side with developing-world
plaintiffs or defendants, the stability that the tribunal will provide and the
certainty that, as time passes, all tribunal members will act as impartial judges
(and not advocates) should lead even developed states to recognize that the
tribunal, as part of a system of choice, warrants their support.
At this point, the Law of the Sea Conference is not assured success. If the
Conference is to be successful, all delegations must continue to work towards a
convention which balances the rights and the duties of all states in a just and
equitable manner. And if the Convention itself is to be a success and if conflicts
.resulting from its misapplication or misinterpretation are to be avoided, a
meaningful chapter on dispute settlement must be made an integral part of the
Law of the Sea Convention.
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